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Biopreparat is a Russian government-funded organization that has been alleged to have directed the 
Soviet biological warfare (BW) program. Recent disclosures suggest that Biopreparat may still be 
involved in BW activities--research, development, production, and even trade and sales--with varying 
degrees of Russian government complicity. 
 
Political analysts suggest that the interim Putin presidency or an imminent full-term Putin presidency 
will have to ultimately make a policy decision between supporting supporters of continuing Russian BW 
program activities or those now or at one time involved in BW activities who wish to apply BW-related 
knowledge solely to various "peaceful purposes." However, students of political power would point out 
that there's a third very reasonable choice--and that is to engage in both. 
 
Continuing covert and clandestine BW program activities can contribute to Russian military prowess, the 
deterrent aspects of military prowess (given that adversaries never can be sure about Russian 
capabilities), and maintaining the domestic political support (for Mr. Putin) of BW supporters. 
Concurrently and overtly applying BW-related knowledge for "peaceful purposes" provides additional 
benefits of facilitating various types of aid from governments, bilateral and multilateral governmental 
organizations, and nongovernmental organizations--as well significant propaganda benefits that lead to 
yet other positive consequences. 
 
This third option of deciding between two options by doing both is as old as political history itself--and 
still too often ignored. (See Beahrs, J.O. (1992). Paradoxical effects in political systems. Political 
Psychology, 13, 755-769; Hart, R.P . (1982). A commentary on popular assumptions about poliitcal 
communication. Human Communication Research, 8, 366-389; Miller, J. (January 25, 2000). U.S. aid is 
diverted to germ warfare, Russian scientists say. The New York Times, p. A6; Rustin, M., & Rustin, M. 
(1994). Coups d'etat and catastrophic change: Shakespeare's Julius Caesar. British Journal of 
Psychotherapy, 11, 242-259; Welles, J. (1981). The sociobiology of self-deception. Human Ethology 
Newsletter, 3, 14-19; Wortham, S., & Locher, M. (1999). Embedded metapragmatics and lying 
politicians. Language and Communication, 19, 109-125.) (Keywords: Biological Warfare, Military 
Strategy, Russia.) 
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